Armenia vs Azerbaijan: Nagorno-Karabakh and the New Caucasus

As of April 2026, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is over — at least in the form it existed for 35 years. Azerbaijan fully controls the territory. The Armenian population that lived there has fled. A peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan is closer than at any point in decades, but significant obstacles remain. The South Caucasus is being reshaped by events that unfolded with stunning speed in 2023.

The historical roots

Armenia and Azerbaijan are neighbors with very different histories and identities. Armenia is one of the oldest Christian nations in the world. Azerbaijan is a majority-Shia Muslim country with strong historical ties to Turkey. Both were absorbed into the Russian Empire in the 19th century and then into the Soviet Union.

Nagorno-Karabakh is a mountainous region whose population was overwhelmingly Armenian for most of its recorded history. Under Soviet administrative decisions in the 1920s, it was placed inside the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic as an autonomous region. This decision was controversial from the beginning. Armenian officials petitioned Moscow repeatedly over the decades to transfer Karabakh to Armenia. Moscow refused each time.

When the Soviet Union began to weaken in the late 1980s, the Karabakh issue exploded. In 1988, the Karabakh regional assembly voted to join Armenia. Pogroms against Armenians followed in Azerbaijani cities. Mass refugee movements began. By the time the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991, both countries were already at war.

The first war (1988-1994)

The first Nagorno-Karabakh war was fought under conditions of general post-Soviet chaos. Both armies were built from former Soviet units and equipment. Armenian forces, supported by volunteer fighters and better-organized command structures, won a series of decisive engagements. By the time a ceasefire was signed in May 1994, Armenian forces controlled Nagorno-Karabakh and seven surrounding Azerbaijani districts — approximately 20% of Azerbaijan's internationally recognized territory.

The war killed an estimated 30,000 people and displaced more than a million. Most of the displaced were Azerbaijanis forced out of Karabakh and the surrounding areas. The Armenian population of Karabakh became the effective sovereign under the name 'Republic of Artsakh,' though no country — not even Armenia — formally recognized it.

The long frozen conflict

For 26 years after 1994, the conflict was frozen. Armenia controlled Karabakh and the surrounding territories. Azerbaijan did not accept this. Diplomatic negotiations under the auspices of the OSCE Minsk Group (co-chaired by Russia, France, and the United States) made no substantive progress. Periodic skirmishes killed soldiers on both sides. Neither country prepared its population for the compromises any realistic peace would require.

Azerbaijan used the intervening years to transform. Its oil and gas wealth funded a massive military buildup. Defense spending grew every year. New equipment was acquired from Russia, Israel, and increasingly Turkey. Azerbaijani officers trained with Turkish counterparts. By the late 2010s, the military balance that had favored Armenia in 1994 had decisively shifted.

The 2020 war

In September 2020, Azerbaijan launched a 44-day offensive that recovered most of the territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh and significant portions of Karabakh itself. The war was decisive and demonstrated several things that changed how militaries around the world think about warfare.

Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 drones proved devastatingly effective. They systematically destroyed Armenian armor, air defenses, and command posts from standoff ranges. Armenian forces had no effective counter. Videos of Bayraktar strikes circulated globally and transformed the drone from a niche capability into a mainstream military tool. The Bayraktar's success in Karabakh directly shaped decisions in Ukraine and elsewhere.

Israeli weapons — loitering munitions, precision missiles, surveillance systems — also played a major role. Azerbaijan demonstrated that a determined mid-sized power with adequate resources could buy decisive military advantage from global markets. A Russia-brokered ceasefire in November 2020 ended active combat. Armenia agreed to return the surrounding territories to Azerbaijani control and accept a Russian peacekeeping presence in what remained of Armenian-held Karabakh.

The 2023 lightning offensive

In September 2023, Azerbaijan launched a 24-hour military operation that ended Armenian control of Nagorno-Karabakh entirely. The Armenian defenders were quickly overwhelmed. The local Armenian authorities surrendered. Within days, the entire ethnic Armenian population of Karabakh — approximately 100,000 people — fled to Armenia. Human rights organizations and some Western governments characterized this as ethnic cleansing, though Azerbaijan rejected that framing.

Russia, which had maintained a peacekeeping force in Karabakh under the 2020 agreement, did not intervene. The peacekeepers watched as Azerbaijani forces advanced. Many observers noted that Russia was heavily committed in Ukraine and unwilling or unable to uphold its security commitments to Armenia. This was a significant blow to Russian prestige in the post-Soviet space.

The 2023 offensive closed the Nagorno-Karabakh question as a practical matter. The territorial dispute that had defined the South Caucasus for 35 years was resolved by force. The cost to the Armenian population of Karabakh was total displacement. The cost to the regional order was further erosion of Russian influence.

The Zangezur corridor

With Karabakh resolved, attention has shifted to a new dispute: the 'Zangezur corridor.' Azerbaijan wants a transportation link through southern Armenia connecting its main territory to Nakhchivan, an Azerbaijani exclave separated from the rest of the country by Armenia. Turkey supports this demand strongly — the corridor would also connect Turkey to Azerbaijan and Central Asia via a land route.

Armenia has resisted. The corridor would run through Armenian sovereign territory and Armenia fears losing control of it. Tehran has also strongly opposed the corridor. Iran shares a border with Armenia in the area and views the corridor as a threat — both because it would reduce Iran's traditional role in north-south trade and because it would further entrench Turkish influence in the region.

The Zangezur question is unresolved as of 2026 and could become the next flashpoint in the South Caucasus. It is also tied up with larger questions about regional alignment, Turkish ambition, and Iranian anxiety.

Shifting alignments

The aftermath of 2023 has driven significant realignments across the region.

Russia diminished

Russia was the traditional security guarantor of Armenia through the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Russian peacekeepers were supposed to protect Armenian interests in Karabakh. Neither happened when it mattered. Armenian public opinion of Russia has shifted dramatically. The Armenian government has begun orienting toward the European Union, the United States, and France. CSTO obligations have been publicly questioned.

Turkey ascendant

Turkey is the clear winner of the post-2020 order in the South Caucasus. Its ally Azerbaijan has won decisive victories. Its influence has grown. A Zangezur corridor would extend its physical connectivity to the Turkic world. Turkey's approach to the region combines military support, infrastructure investment, and pan-Turkic cultural narrative.

Iran anxious

Iran has lost a Christian buffer state (Armenia's weakening position), faces Turkish encroachment on its northern border, and worries about the implications of Azerbaijani-Israeli cooperation. Tehran has quietly increased its own engagement with Armenia. It has also made clear publicly that it would oppose any arrangement that cut Iran off from Armenia or shifted the border alignment in ways Iran considers hostile.

Armenia westward

Armenia's government has made explicit efforts to diversify its external relationships. It has sought closer ties with the European Union, France (in particular), the United States, and India. Whether these new relationships can provide real security is an open question — Armenia is landlocked, geographically isolated, and bordered by two states (Turkey and Azerbaijan) that are formal adversaries.

Military balance in 2026

Azerbaijan's military has continued to grow since 2023. Its defense spending is roughly double Armenia's. Its equipment is newer. Its relationship with Turkey provides ongoing training, intelligence, and weapons flows. Its confidence is high. In any renewed conventional conflict, Azerbaijan would hold significant advantages.

Armenia's military is in the middle of a painful reconstruction. After the 2020 and 2023 defeats, the Armenian government concluded that the old doctrine and force structure — heavy reliance on Soviet-era equipment, built around defending Karabakh — was bankrupt. A reform process is underway, but it will take years to produce results. Armenia is also seeking to diversify its weapons suppliers away from Russia.

What could happen next

Scenario 1: A peace treaty

Armenia and Azerbaijan finalize a comprehensive peace treaty covering borders, transport corridors, and economic relations. This is the scenario both governments publicly support. Significant progress has been made in negotiations. But unresolved issues — particularly around the Zangezur corridor and Armenian diaspora demands for justice — continue to delay finalization.

Scenario 2: Frozen hostility

A peace treaty proves impossible in the short term. The two countries avoid open conflict but maintain mutual hostility. Border incidents continue. Economic connections remain limited. The corridor question remains unresolved. This is the current trajectory.

Scenario 3: A new flashpoint

Tensions over the Zangezur corridor, border incidents, or a provocation from either side trigger renewed fighting. This is possible but politically costly for Azerbaijan after its 2023 victory. Armenia has limited capability to initiate conflict. The most likely flashpoint would be an Azerbaijani effort to force the corridor question.

Scenario 4: Regional integration

Peace is followed by genuine economic and infrastructure integration across the South Caucasus, connecting Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey, and Iran into a functioning regional economy. This is the optimistic scenario that some Western and regional actors advocate. It would require overcoming decades of hostility that have become institutionalized on all sides.

The bottom line

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict ended in 2023 with the complete victory of Azerbaijan. This is a fact of the new order. What remains to be decided is how Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkey, Russia, Iran, and the broader international community adjust to that fact. The adjustment is underway and far from complete. The South Caucasus is quieter than it has been in a generation but not stable. The next phase depends on whether a durable peace can be built on foundations laid by a war whose costs have been carried almost entirely by one side.